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NOISE LITIGATION AT PUBLIC AIRPORTSt
By LYMAN M. TONDEL, JR.tt
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Facts
M OST AIRPORTS, like Kennedy, O'Hare, Seattle-Tacoma, and Los
Angeles, were originally located in thinly-populated outskirts of
metropolitan areas. However, the subsequent geographical growth of cities,
the nationwide exodus to suburbs, and the tendency of airports, with their
collateral access roads, to attract real estate developers have brought more
and more residents into areas adjoining airports.' At the same time, the
volume of intercity passenger travel by air has so greatly expanded in this
country that it now exceeds, in passenger miles, the volume of intercity
public transportation by buses and railroads combined;' and the unwar-
rantedly feareds-but noisy-jets handle more and more of this traf-
t This article was originally prepared for presentation at the 1965 annual meeting of the Section
of Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law of the American Bar Association held in Miami
Beach in August, 1965, and it is published with the permission of that Section. The article and foot-
notes have been revised to reflect subsequent developments. The extensive help of the author's asso-
ciate, James D. Wiese, Esq., of the New York Bar, is gratefully acknowledged.
tt B.A., University of Washington; LL.B., Harvard. The author represents various airlines in
airport noise matters.
Congressman, if you visualize going out in the boondocks somewhere in the middle
of a bunch of farmland with low population density and building an airport, you
have to build two things. You have to build the airport and then you have to build
a road out to the airport and the road usually takes the form of an expressway which
didn't exist before.
When you build that, you give easy access to that area, to the center of the urban
population. The result of the road is to bring in people and whether you like it or not,
you are going to wind up with a great deal of development around the airport ...
Testimony of Frank W. Kolk, Hearings on Aircraft Noise Problems Before Subcom-
mittees of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th & 87th
Cong. 630 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Harris Committee Hearings, after Congress-
man Oren Harris, Chairman of the Committee].
For example, the site of John F. Kennedy International Airport, previously known as New
York International Airport (Idlewild), was selected, and the initial acreage was acquired, in 1941.
The neighboring localities, Nassau County and the Town of Hempstead, helped substantially in
assembling the property. The report on which the Board of Estimate of New York City acted, in
voting to acquire the initial acreage on 17 December 1941, said that the airport "will be made
accessible by the construction of connecting highways on the east and west sides of the field leading
to the Belt parkway and other connecting avenues of vehicular travel." When the site was selected,
it was necessary to fill a substantial part of the area because it was largely marsh land. A portion of
the site was being used as the Idlewild Golf Course and there were some homes in the area, but
generally the area was vacant. Today much of the area around the airport, long since readily ac-
cessible, is solidly built up. Developers are at this very time adding numerous residential units in
areas under the approach paths. See generally, Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the Borough of
Queens as Amicus Curiae, Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
AIR TRANsp. ASS'N oF AMERICA, 1964 FACTS AND FIGURES 33. In 1963, the airlines' passenger
miles in the United States were 38,456 million and those of railroads and motor buses combined
were estimated at 35,927 million.
' While fear of jet planes on approach and take-off accentuates the reaction of many people
to the noise they produce, this fear is relatively unfounded. See the 1963 report of the Special Sub-
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fic.4 Jet planes in increasing numbers have been landing and taking off
closer to more and more residences, and the natural desire of their occupants
to enjoy quiet has been brought into conflict with the need of the com-
munity for modern airports. The airport noise problem is not unique. Noise
is also an unfortunate concomitant of many of today's machines and
household conveniences."
The public importance of the air transport industry and of a nation-
wide system of first-class airports, both for air commerce and for the
national defense," has been recognized by Congress. It has not only de-
clared the navigable airspace to be in the public domain,' and created the
CABs and the FAA' to regulate, respectively, the economics and safety
of air traffic, but also has necessarily preempted the regulation of air
traffic.1" States, and their political subdivisions, have recognized such pre-
committee on Regulatory Agencies of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Investigation and Study of Aircraft Noise Problems, H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1963) [hereinafter cited as the 1963 Report], in which the Subcommittee found as follows:
2.01 There is no evidence before the subcommittee of any permanent physical injury
to persons or extensive physical damage to property as a direct result of noise created
by civil transport aircraft.
From 1950 to 1963, the number of nonoccupant fatalities in the United States resulting from
accidents of transportation media were approximately as follows:
Automobiles (including taxis) 121,853
Buses 4,908
Railroad passenger trains 12,830
Air carrier aircraft (excluding propeller accidents
involving non-moving aircraft) 38
Eleven of the thirty-eight deaths were in the two Elizabeth, New Jersey crashes on 22 January and
11 February 1952. National Aircraft Noise Abatement Council, News Letter, 1 July 1964. See also
note 52 infra.
4Even by the end of 1963, 420 of the 1,837 aircraft owned by the commercial airlines were
pure jets, and 263 were turbo-prop aircraft. However, these 683 aircraft handled more than 80%
of the traffic. AIR TRANSP. Ass'N ov AMERICA, 1964 FACTS AND FIGURES 6, 11-12.
5As early as 1934, long before the jet age, the rising noise level in urban communities was
recognized as a growing problem. Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 567, 582 (1934).
See also Schonberg, The Sound of Sounds That is New York, N. Y. Times, 23 May 1965, § 6
(Magazine), p. 38.
o Scheduled airlines have long had a major defense role as our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
See, e.g., Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-66 (1964); Exec.
Order No. 10219, 16 Fed. Reg. 1983 (1951); Aircraft Allocation, 14 C.F.R. 5 1502.1 (1960); and
28 Fed. Reg. §§ 2833-34 (1963). Through CRAF-an operating unit of about 350 of the most
modern transport aircraft, completely equipped with flight and ground crews-the airlines are
ready for military service on thirty-six hour notice.
There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the
United States a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of
the United States. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 104, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1304 (1964).
"Navigable airspace" means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight pre-
scribed by regulations issued under this Act, and shall include airspace needed to
insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5
101, 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964).
'The Civil Aeronautics Board was established in its present form by § 201 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 741, 49 U.S.C. § 1321 (1964). It was created, however, by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 980, under the name Civil Aeronautics Authority, and redesig-
nated as the Civil Aeronautics Board by Reorganization Plan No. IV of 1940.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 301(a), 72 Stat. 744, 49 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1964).
10In Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1956), it was
held that, "The federal regulatory system . . . has preempted the field [of air traffic] below as
well as above 1,000 feet from the ground." This has been frequently confirmed. See, e.g., City of
Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v.
County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rep. 25 (1961) (dictum). However,
in Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 554-55, 39
Cal. Rep. 708, 714-15, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,156 (1964), the Supreme Court of
California said in dicta that Congress did not intend the federal legislation to be exclusive and,
therefore, that state action affecting flight operations is not precluded so long as it does not conflict
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emption."
Meanwhile, numerous public airports have been authorized to handle
the burgeoning air traffic,"2 for which the competition has been keen.
When threatened with a cutback in operations at a neighboring airport,"
or even a failure to maintain competitive jet service, 4 localities have sought
more or better operations despite noise problems.
As a bridge requires approaches, so an airport requires, for safety, clear
zones and zones free of obstructions above specified heights. While the
location of a public airport is the owner's decision, the airport must meet
detailed standards fixed by the FAA, including those relating to clear
zones, if it is to receive federal aid. Even if no aid is sought, airport con-
struction or alteration plans must be cleared with the FAA.'" The FAA
does not, however, even as a condition to receiving federal aid, require
airport owners to acquire adjacent properties for the sole purpose of noise
abatement, and the extent to which airport owners have done so, if at all,
has been up to them individually.
Every runway approach area in the country is different, not only topo-
graphically but also in its residential history, its local government, its
zoning laws, its ambient noise, its leadership, its economic status, and the
ability and willingness of its residents to adjust to nearby airport opera-
tions. In addition, every airport owner and operator differs in its attitude
with federal law. Since the FAA exercises such broad powers of regulation of air traffic and the
enforcement thereof, it is not apparent how such state (or local) regulation of commercial air
traffic could fail to be in conflict with federal regulation.
"CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21240:
This State recognizes the authority of the Federal Government to regulate the
operation of aircraft and to control the use of the airways, and nothing in this act
shall be construed to give the commission [of aeronautics] the power to so regulate
and control safety factors in the operation of aircraft or to control use of the airways.
12The 1963 Report stated at 17-18 that in 1963 there were about sixty-five existing air-
ports in the United States equipped with facilities adequate to accommodate jet-powered transport-
type aircraft and that the national airport development plan for the next four years envisioned the
further improvement of sixty-five additional airports to accommodate jet-propelled aircraft.
"' Harris Committee Hearings at 51 8:
There was a very vociferous group around the Midway Airport that had much to
say about the noise problem, about the activity of Midway Airport, at one time the
world's busiest airport.
There is not today a scheduled airline serving Midway Airport, and it is my under-
standing that that same group now, because of the economic blight that has hit the
merchants and the people in the area, would like to have, and have come to the
CAB in one form or another, to require some service still to be performed at Midway
Airport. Testimony of Leslie 0. Barnes.
See also the Newark Star-Ledger, 9 January 1962, where City Council President Bontempo was
quoted as saying that barring jets from Newark Airport during 1960 had "caused a 30.5% drop
in business there" but that "with the coming of jets 'things are humming again.' "
14Ft. Worth Investigation, CAB Docket No. 7382, CAB Order No. E-15770 (14 Sept. 1960)
(supplemental opinion). There, Fort Worth successfully contended that its air service would be
"inadequate" unless jet service was provided.
" 60 Star. 170 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1101-19, 1349-50 (1964); Federal Aviation
Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 151.9, 151.11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as FAR].
" In fact, it is debatable whether the FAA has the power to require a public airport owner to
acquire lands for noise abatement reasons alone. However, under the Federal Airport Act, 60 Stat.
170 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1101-19 (1964), the Administrator of the FAA may not
approve an airport project for a federal grant until he receives written assurances that:
appropriate action, including the adoption of zoning laws, has been or will be taken,
to the extent reasonable, to restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the immediate
vicinity of the airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal airport opera-
tions including landing and take-off of aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 1110(4).
See Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 207, 218 (1964).
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towards the complaints of airport neighbors, in its authority and ability,
financial and otherwise, to deal with them, and in its determinations as to
how much property (including air easements), if any, should be acquired17
in order to mitigate annoyance to airport neighbors. A balancing of inter-
ests is required, and it must not be overlooked that, at least in the first
instance, public airport authorities usually must use taxpayers' money to
acquire any such property rights.
In spite of the continuing efforts of the air transport industry and the
Government to reduce the noise of airport operations1 -because all con-
cerned recognize the seriousness of the problem 1"-there are necessarily
some property owners who feel that the noise created by arriving and de-
parting aircraft has interfered with the enjoyment of their homes to such
a degree that they should be compensated. However, very few have seri-
ously sought to have flights at a publicly owned and operated airport
enjoined' and, when attempted, such efforts have been uniformly un-
successful.'
Most complainants seek only noise reduction and an understanding atti-
tude rather than relief in the courts. When suits for damages are actually
brought they present only another example of the age-old question of
how far the individual must tolerate public improvements that interfere
with the use or enjoyment of his property before he is entitled to com-
pensation. It is important not to allow the novelty of flight and the
rather revolutionary nature of jets to make it seem that the legal problems
involved are without precedent. Railroad cases, smoke cases, stench cases,
and others by the hundreds have dealt with similar problems." A failure
to see these problems in perspective and in the context of legal history
"See City of Carlsbad v. Ballard, 71 N.M. 397, 378 P.2d 814, 8 Av. Cas. 3 17,492 (1963),
where it was held that the city had exceeded its authority by condemning more land than was
needed for a clear zone.
's 1963 Report 13-18, 20-22. In addition, the Report stated that, "there is no evidence that
cost has served to bar any measure which would substantially minimize or eliminate aircraft noise
nuisances." Id. at 26.
" Notably, the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, convened
a twenty-four member Jet Aircraft Noise Panel in Washington on 29 October 1965. The con-
clusions, recommendations, and underlying papers were published by the United States Government
Printing Office in March, 1966, under the title Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports.
The Office of Science and Technology is continuing its activity in the field. The 1963 Report,
based on ten days of hearings in 1959-1962 in New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Ingle-
wood, Cal. and resulting in a 725-page transcript, was also a principal indication of the degree of
this concern. Note also the creation of the National Aircraft Noise Abatement Counsel and its
continuing nationwide activity in the interest of airplane noise abatement. Its members are the
Aerospace Industries Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the Airport Operators Council,
the Air Transport Association of America, and the American Association of Airport Executives.
'0 In many cases a request for an injunction has been made as an alternative to damages. In
the last eleven years several suits have been brought to enjoin operations at private airports or to
enjoin runway construction at public airports. However, only three cases have been discovered
which were brought solely to enjoin regularly scheduled flights at public airports: Southwest Coun-
cil of Civic Organizations, Civil No. 64C694, N.D. Ill., 2 Oct. 1964; Loma Portal Civic Club v.
American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rep. 708, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av.
Cas.) 5 17,156 (1964); and Crudgington v. League, Civil No. CA-4-442, N.D. Tex., filed 23
April 1965.
21See Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1581,
1593 & n.92 (1961).
"2See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). See also McKee v.
City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964), which involved the odor from a sewage
disposal plant and which drew an analogy to airport noise cases. See generally, Lloyd, supra note 5.
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resulted in the Martin decision,- to which further reference will be made
later.
The role law and lawyers can play in reducing noise attendant to air-
port operations must not be exaggerated. The FAA has led the way, as
it must (since it is responsible for air safety), in noise abatement operating
techniques, with very substantial and expensive cooperation from air
carriers and pilots. Engine and airframe manufacturers, the Federal Gov-
ernment, and many engineers and scientists, both in government and in
industry, are conducting extensive research and development programs
to try to reduce the noise at the source. Progress in these technical areas
cannot be dictated by law or by the courts.
The third major means of noise abatement, more compatible land use
around airports, is not a problem that can be dealt with by a neat formula
or by a single nationwide approach. The individuality of each airport and
of each approach area precludes uniform treatment.' Effective federal
legislation requiring land acquisitions or restricting land use in existing
approach areas, even if financially feasible, would raise both policy ques-
tions of home rule and legal problems of constitutionality." There might,
however, be a possibility of evolving practical and constitutional federal
legislation of more limited scope. Such legislation might, for example,
authorize the FAA to contribute or lend federal funds toward the
acquisition of further properties or easements for the purpose of reducing
noise annoyance. This might be based upon a detailed showing of the
necessity for such an acquisition and upon specified conditions, including
perhaps a binding commitment by the appropriate governmental authority
not to permit incompatible land uses in prescribed areas near the airport.'
In this connection legal scholars might usefully devote more attention
to the powers of municipalities and airport owners to acquire or condemn
land for noise abatement and to the legality, under the police power, of
zoning for that purpose. Greater knowledge and imaginative thinking in
this field might prove useful. It is unfortunately true that efforts to date
to persuade local authorities to refuse building permits for homes or
apartment houses under approach paths have frequently been futile, even
where residents already living near the building site had suits pending
against the airport for noise annoyance.
27
23Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540, 8 Av. Cas. 5 18,324 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
' See testimony of Crocker Snow, Harris Committee Hearings at 661-62.
25 Many property owners under approach paths do not want to move out of the affected area,
even though they naturally would like a reduction in noise. See 1963 Report at 20. Thus, even a
local, let alone a federal, land acquisition program would be likely to antagonize many residents.
Furthermore, federal legislation requiring land acquisition or forbidding residential land use in
specified areas around airports solely because of the noise problem would have to be justified under
the commerce power.
2 For the most recent federal legislation that relates to this problem, see note 16 supra.
2 E.g., in the San Francisco Bay Area, the substantial Flamingo Apartments were built in Bay-
side Manor, Millbrae, at the south end of Runway 1 at the San Francisco International Airport,
even though residents of Millbrae who live in the same neighborhood were suing the City and
County of San Francisco because of airport noise.
Furthermore, in the area just south of the Seattle-Tacoma Airport, where at least 196 property
owners had brought suits as the result of airport noise, a development of about sixteen homes was
undertaken.
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An authoritative study on the law of annoyance would also be of
great value. Such a study should not just relate to noise and airplanes but
should be a comprehensive analysis of all English and American legisla-
tion, cases, and commentaries that concern alleged injury to interests in
property or interference with the use or enjoyment thereof caused by any
type of annoyance, public or private, as distinguished from tangible
physical injury."' Such a study would serve to guide the developing law,
legislative and administrative, as well as judicial, into principled channels.
The discussion which follows deals with public airport noise litigation,
since cases involving private airports reflect quite different considerations.
Although noise cases at private airports" may have led to some false
notions as to the law of noise at public airports,"' the private airport cases
have been of increasingly little significance. Since federal regulation of
the scheduled airlines (the primary users of public airports) is "intensive
and exclusive,"'" especially in the vicinity of airports that have control
towers,3 and since the penalties for violating FAA regulations or control
tower orders are severe," this discussion is concerned almost entirely with
noise from aircraft landing and taking-off in accordance with regulations.
Negligent or illegal flights raise different questions that are more easily
answered under familiar rules of law.
2 For discussions of the legal aspects of the airport noise problem, see generally, Dygert, supra
note 16; Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1 (1964); Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH.
L. REV. 1313 (1958); Morton, Some Real Property Aspects of Avigation, 35 Nn. L. REV. 277
(1955-1956); and Nagel, The Causby Case and The Relation of Landowners and Aviators-A New
Theory for the Protection of the Landowner, 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 112 (1947). In addition, War-
ren M. Christopher prepared a paper in connection with the 1965 annual meeting of the American
Bar Association, entitled The Developing Law of Aircraft Noise. This paper, which was not actu-
ally delivered, appears in A.B.A. REP. (Pub. Util. Section) 70 (1965).
The only papers published to date on the law of noise, generally, seem to be Lloyd, supra note
5, and Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1965), which, within the confines of
an article, does approach liability for noise in the analytical manner suggested in this text. No other
published article or treatise has been discovered which discusses liability for noise alone, from what-
ever source the noise is derived. Professor Allison Dunham of the University of Chicago did some-
thing of the generic sort suggested in the text, after the Griggs decision, with respect to the Su-
preme Court's doctrine on the law of expropriation. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
29E.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 1 Av. Cas. 315 (6th Cir. 1932); An-
derson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497, 3 Av. Cas. 17,887 (1952); Smith v. New Eng-
land Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 1 Av. Cas. 197 (1930); Hyde v. Somerset Air
Serv., I N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645, 2 Av. Cas. 5 14,755 (Ch. 1948); and Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pa.
D. & C. 31, 1 Av. Cas. 381 (Ct. C.P. 1932).
"0 For instance, in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., supra note 29, the plaintiffs successfully
obtained an injunction against the operation of a private airport in Ohio. When Cuyahoga County
sought to acquire the same site for a public airport fourteen years later the nearby residents brought
an unsuccessful taxpayers' suit to enjoin the acquisition claiming, inter alia, that the prior decree
barred the county from using the site as an airport. State ex rel. Helsel v. Commissioners of
Cuyahoga County, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Ct. C.P. 1947), aff'd, so Ohio L. Abs. 338,
78 N.E.2d 694 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948). As the
plaintiffs learned, the law draws a substantial distinction between public and private airports.
" In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944), the Court stated:
Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air commerce.
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander around in the sky
like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal in-
spection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system
of federal commands. (Mr. Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion.)
2 See FAR § 91.87.
"aSee Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 901, 72 Stat. 783, 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1964); FAR 5
13.15 (civil penalties); FAR § 13.17 (seizure of aircraft); and FAR § 13.19 (loss of pilot's certi-
ficate).
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II. INJUNCTION CASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECOURSE
A. Injunction Cases
While a few injunctions were issued in early cases to prohibit either
the continuance of operations" or to restrict the use as of airfields that were
privately owned and operated, or merely privately operated, the operations
of a publicly owned and publicly operated airport have not been suspended
or restricted by court action. " Where airport neighbors have gone to court
seeking injunctions as an alternate form of relief, the public need for a
public airport, expressed either through the "legalized nuisance" doctrinea"
or otherwise, has always been found to outweigh the complainants' desires
to close the public airport or restrict its operation.
Injunctions have not been issued because our national airport system is
vital."s For valid, practical reasons, the Congress properly preempted the
field of air traffic regulation,"' and any injunction that might affect air
safety or the regulation of air traffic, directly or indirectly, would be in
conflict with the proper and safe operation of the airways under federal
control.' ° Even an injunction that closed an important airport for only
part of every day would raise havoc with traffic control not only at that
airport but also at connecting and even more remote airports due to the
rerouting and congestion that would result.41
B. Administrative Relief-On The Books And In Practice
Since airport neighbors are likely to want to keep their homes in spite
of the noise caused by the neighboring airport operations, and usually
seek noise reduction rather than damages," how may they proceed to
a Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 1 Av. Cas. 315 (6th Cir. 1932); Gay v.
Taylor, 19 Pa. D. & C. 31, 1 Av. Cas. 381 (Ct. C.P. 1932).
a"Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497, 3 Av. Cas. 17,887 (1952); Hyde v.
Somerset Air Serv., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645, 2 Av. Cas. 5 14,755 (Ch. 1948).
a6See Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1581
(1961). In at least the following cases injunctions were granted with respect to airports that were
publicly owned but privately operated: Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42
N.E.2d 575, 1 Av. Cas. 1014 (1942); Reynolds v. Wilson, 2 Av. Cas. 14,863 (Ct. C.P., Pa.
1949); and Dlugas v. United Air Lines, 53 Pa. D. & C. 402, 1 Av. Cas. 1140 (Ct. C.P., 1944).
" See text accompanying note 62 infra.
"'See N.Y. Times, 6 June 1963, p. 25, col. 3 for President Kennedy's description of the im-
portance of the civil air transport system.
" Cases cited note 10 supra. As a practical matter, how could jets traveling 600 miles per hour
safely be subject to multi-state regulation?
"°In City of Newark v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750, 757, 5 Av. Cas. 5 17,828,
17,833 (D.N.J. 1958), the court stated:
An attempted amendment of the present regulations by the Court . . . would be
an unwarranted interference with the regulatory power vested in the . . . Board and
could result only in an unseemly conflict between the administrative agency and the
court. If the courts undertook, by judicial decree, to promulgate regulations and
establish flight patterns peculiarly applicable to each major airport . . . the uniformity
contemplated by the Civil Aeronautics Act and essential to a comprehensive regulatory
system would soon be impaired.
41 For instance, if there were a 10:00 p.m.- 7:00 a.m. curfew on night flights in London and
New York, only three hours a day would be unrestricted in each city. Testimony of John R. Wiley,
Harris Committee Hearings at 528-30.
42 See note 25 supra.
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achieve this result if they cannot obtain an injunction?43 Congress has
provided that:
(a) Any person may file with the [Federal Aviation] Administrator or
the [Civil Aeronautics] Board, as to matters within their respective juris-
dictions, a complaint in writing with respect to anything done or omitted to
be done by any person in contravention of any provisions of this chapter,
or of any requirement established pursuant thereto. If the person complained
against shall not satisfy the complaint and there shall appear to be any
reasonable ground for investigating the complaint, it shall be the duty of
the Administrator or the Board to investigate the matters complained of.44
Therefore, any operation of an airplane contrary to an Air Traffic Con-
trol instruction is a violation subject to investigation and sanction.5
The FAA's enforcement power also extends to its regulations govern-
ing air traffic that are intended to reduce objectionable noise. Such regula-
tions include those that require aircraft to climb as quickly as possible,6
to remain above specified heights as long as practicable on landing, 7 and
to use, whenever possible, preferential runways designed to route planes
over relatively unpopulated areas. Furthermore, the FAA's regulations
provide that "any person who knows of a violation of the Federal Avia-
tion Act ...or of any regulation . .. issued under it, may report it to
appropriate personnel of an FAA . . . office,"" and that such reports
shall be investigated by FAA employees. For the purpose of conducting
such investigations the agency is empowered to conduct public hearings,
take evidence and depositions, issue subpoenas, and compel testimony.0
The only administrative hearing conducted to date by the FAA on
noise complaints was at New Orleans in 1962." This well-attended and
well-publicized hearing served not only to bring to the FAA's official
attention the complaints and suggestions of some of the people in the
particular approach zone involved," but also to acquaint the complainants
with the problems involved in controlling traffic in and out of a major
" In passing, it should be noted that at many major airports either the FAA, the airport opera-
tor, or some form of airport committee has a noise abatement office or complaint center where airport
neighbors are invited to come with their complaints and with any suggestions as to how the noise
may be reduced, consistent with safety.
44Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002, 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964).
45 FAR § 91.75(b). See sanctions cited note 33 supra.
46 FAR 5 91.87(f) (2).47 FAR 5 93.33.4
'FAR § 91.87(g).49FAR § 13.1(a).
"°FAR 5 13.3.
" A group of airport neighbors petitioned the FAA to conduct an investigation and hearing of
complaints, and to discontinue turbojet aircraft operations at Moisant International Airport (New
Orleans) or, as an alternative, revise existing traffic patterns on landings and take-offs. Rosemary
Angell & Mrs. A. Angell, FAA Regulatory Docket No. 861 (31 May 1962). The Administrator's
denial of the petition, supported by a nine page opinion, was upheld in Angell v. FAA, Civil No.
17188, D.C. Cir., 21 May 1963 (per curiam).
52 Many such suggestions prove to be unusable because they are based on factual misconceptions.
Even certain elemental facts regarding airports are surprisingly little known. For example:
(a) Runways are not located by whim, as some believe, but, necessarily, in accordance with the
prevailing winds in the area; and
(b) Jet engines have proved to be much more (rather than less) reliable than piston engines.
This last aspect is of substantial importance because fear of jets has undoubtedly been an important
factor in the minds of plaintiffs. See Harris Committee Hearings at 506. See also note 3 supra.
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airport. This case resulted in no FAA changes in traffic patterns, but it
did demonstrate one way for airport neighbors formally to press their
complaints before the appropriate administrative body if they so desire.
III. DAMAGE CASES
A. Extent Of Damages Heretofore Recovered
Before exploring even superficially the extraordinarily interesting his-
tory of the legal theories used in damage suits predicated on airport noise,
it should be observed that the damages recovered in public, non-military
airport noise cases have been astonishingly small in view of the professional
and public attention such cases have attracted.
In the last eleven years, damages have been actually recovered in only
nine such cases in this country. In eight of them,53 a total of $470,334 was
recovered against civil airport operators on the ground that there had been
a constitutional taking or, in two Washington cases, a constitutional dam-
aging. In the remaining case,54 $12,500 was recovered against Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation on a nuisance theory. Insofar as the critical issues
in Lockbeed were concerned, the airport was public only in a technical
sense because the flights in question were test flights by the defendant
manufacturer.
In addition, $751,770 has been recovered over the past eleven years in
twenty-two cases" brought against the United States Government in-
volving military airports. Twenty-one of these recoveries were based on a
constitutional taking theory and one, the Weisberg case, on a negligence
"
3 Johnson v. City & County of Denver, Civil No. 8540, D. Colo., 19 Feb. 1965; Rehmer v.
City & County of Denver, Civil No. 7259, D. Colo., 19 Feb. 1965; Bowling Green-Warren County
Airport Bd. v. Long, 364 S.W.2d 167, 8 Av. Cas. 3 17,297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Porter v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., Civil No. 71091, Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Ky., 19 March
1964, reversed, 397 S.W.2d 146, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965);
Johnson v. Airport Authority of the City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426, 7 Av. Cas.
3 18,212 (1962); Bigham v. City of Charlotte, Super. Ct., Mecklenburg County, N.C., 1959;
and Rose v. Port of Seattle, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,916 (Super. Ct., Wash. 1965)
(apparently based on a taking theory). Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d
540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), was consolidated with Aarhus v. Port of Seattle
for purposes of deciding the Port's liability. Both cases were remanded for ascertainment of dam-
ages. Martin was settled for $150,000 and Aarhus for $250,000.
54 Anderson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 1955 U.S. & Can. Av. 182 (Super. Ct., Cal.).
55 A.J. Hodges Indus., Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.)
18,025 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Aaron v. United States, 340 F.2d 655, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.)
17,248 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cf. 1964); Davis v. United
States, 164 Ct. Cl. 612, 8 Av. Cas. 5 18,075 (1964); Mock v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 473, 8
Av. Cas. 3 18,080 (1964); Mid-States Fats & Oils Corp. v. United States, 8 Av. Cas. 5 17,219
(Ct. Cl. 1962); Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444, 8 Av. Cas. 5 17,127 (Ct. Cl. 1962);
Weisberg v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 815, 7 Av. Cas. 5 18,040 (D. Md. 1961); Bacon v. United
States, 295 F.2d 936, 7 Av. Cas. 5 17,659 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931,
7 Av. Cas. 3 17,662 (Ct. Cl. 1961); James v. United States, N.D. Fla., 1961; Wilson v. United
States, 151 Ct. Cl. 271, 6 Av. Cas. 5 18,275 (1960); Klein v. United States, 6 Av. Cas. 3 18,274
(Ct. Cl. 1960), reVd on reargunent, 285 F.2d 778, 7 Av. Cas. 5 17,186, cert. denied, 366 U.S.
936 (1961); Wright v. United States, 279 F.2d 517, 6 Av. Cas. 5 18,075 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Hopkins
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 245, 6 Av. Cas. 3 17,547 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Pope v. United States,
173 F. Supp. 36, 6 Av. Cas. 5 17,548 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp.
283, 6 Av. Cas. 5 17,310 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Ferguson v. United States, N.D. Fla., 1959; Dick v.
United States, 169 F. Supp. 491 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 181
F. Supp. 658, 5 Av. Cas. 5 18,208 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769, 5
Av. Cas. 3 18,001 (Ct. Cl. 1958); and Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597,
5 Av. Cas. 5 17,935 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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theory. One reason for the greater success that plaintiffs have had against
the United States is that in many cases the Government has admitted a
taking-leaving only the amount of compensation to the court.
There have, of course, been many more cases in which there was no re-
covery.
B. Volume Of Current Litigation
Presently there is a substantial volume of airport noise litigation pend-
ing in various American courts (in addition to one known case abroad,
in Nice, France). Based on data collected by the National Aircraft Noise
Abatement Council (NANAC) as of June, 1965, there were 87 airports
that reported neither pending or recent noise litigation, nor any pending
claim involving airport noise that had not been made the basis for court
action. At 34 other airports, either one or more cases (in several places,
many cases) were pending in June, 1965, or one or more suits had been
disposed of in 1964. At 3 airports claims had been made, but no suits were
pending.
The suits at 8 of the aforementioned 34 airports had been decided
for the defendants or disposed of and those at 2 had been dormant for
some time. Suits were pending at the remaining 24 airports; but in all of
the suits at 2 of these airports there had been a preliminary ruling for
the defendant, and at 1 there had been a preliminary ruling for the
plaintiff. This leaves only 21 airports at which there is other pending
litigation out of the total of 124 that had reported to NANAC (14 air-
ports did not report). When these facts are considered together with the
relatively small amount of damages actually recovered during the last
eleven years, the liability exposure of public airports appears far less than
frequently thought.
C. Theories Of Airport Noise Suits
Airport noise suits have usually been based on one or more of the
theories of: trespass, nuisance, taking, and constitutional damaging. As
later discussed, the taking theory has developed almost to the exclusion of
the others.
1. Trespass
The trespass notion is predicated on a physical invasion of the airspace
over one's property. Although the word trespass is sometimes still used,
the theory has fallen into disuse due to the 1946 Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Causby" and Section 104"7 of the Federal Aviation Act.
In Causby the Court put an end to the ancient maxim of ad coelum
ownership. The Court held that ownership to the sky "has no place in
the modern world,"5 and then went on to decide, "the airspace, apart from
-"328 U.S. 256 (1946). See generally, Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of
Causby and Griggs, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1964), and Nagel, The Causby Case and the Relation
of Landowners and Aviators-A New Theory for the Protection of the Landowner, 14 J. AIR L.
& COM. 112 (1947); Note, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW. 228 (1947), and 32 VA. L. REv. 1191 (1946).
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 104, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
18328 U.S. at 261.
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the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.""
Section 104 states:
There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen
of the United States a public right of freedom of transit through the navi-
gable airspace of the United States.
In addition, section 101 (24) provides that:
"Navigable airspace" means airspace above the minimum altitudes of
flight prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall include
airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."0
Since navigable airspace, within these limits, is public domain and in-
cludes the airspace necessary for take-off or landing, it is evident why the
trespass theory has fallen into disuse. There is only one recent airport
noise case where damages on the trespass theory were allowed, and they
were only nominal. On appeal even that decision was reversed."
2. Nuisance, Including the Theory of "Legalized Nuisance"
A nuisance case involves weighing the plaintiff's interest in the peaceful
enjoyment of his premises against the interests of the defendant and of
the public in the airport and in air transportation. However, where a
public airport created pursuant to a statute or ordinance is involved (which
is usually the case with a large public airport), the doctrine of "legalized
nuisance" comes into play. Simply stated, where a public or quasi-public
enterprise, like a railroad, a power plant, or an airport is expressly author-
ized by legislation, nuisance claims that arise out of its proper operation
are to be denied. The theory is that even if the activity in question would,
if privately conducted, constitute a nuisance, it has been legalized within
constitutional limits by the legislative body on behalf of the public."
The California Supreme Court, in the Loma Portalr' case, reaffirmed the
California version of this rule that applies where, as in Loma Portal, an
injunction is sought. The California rule is that, as a matter of public
5 1 d. at 266.
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 (24), 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1964).
"' Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673, 6 Av. Cas. 5 17,882 (1960). In
a recent aerial spraying case where poison spray was actually deposited on the plaintiff's land which
was adjacent to the land to be sprayed, a trespass was found as a result of overflights. Schronk v.
Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 213, 8 Av. Cas. 5 18,176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), see Note, 31 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 265 (1965). The court cited § 159 of Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Restatement of Torts
(Second), which states:
Flight by aircraft in the airspace above the land of another is a trespass, if; but
only if, (a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land,
and (b) it interferes unreasonably with the other's use and enjoyment of the land.
The Restatement of Torts (Second), which has since been published, retains essentially the same
language in § 159, except that the term "unreasonably" was replaced by the word "substantially."6
,E.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914), and Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878). Airport cases that discuss the theory of "legalized nuisance" include
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 1 Av. Cas. 315 (6th Cir. 1932); Atkinson v.
City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962); Brooks
v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947); and State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79
N.E.2d 698 (Ct. C.P., Ohio 1947).
"' Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal.
Rep. 708, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,156 (1964). Incidentally, this case is one of the few
recent noise cases brought against scheduled airlines alone rather than against the operator of the
airport.
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policy, where private property has been put to public use by a public
service corporation and the public interest has intervened, an injunction
restricting the use will not be issued.
Therefore, activities that have resulted in a "legalized nuisance" are
usually actionable only if an actual taking is involved or, in some states,
if there is a sufficient interference to support a constitutional damaging
claim. While the application of the "legalized nuisance" theory varies from
state to state, it has been quite generally followed in recent airport noise
cases where the issue has arisen. "
After surveying all of the public airport noise cases in the last eleven
years, it appears that there were only two cases in which the nuisance
theory was considered a proper basis for recovery. In Lockheed,"s which
involved a public airport only in a technical sense, $12,500 in damages
was recovered. In the other case, which arose in Georgia, the court held
that the complaint stated a cause of action, so that the case should not
have been dismissed on the pleadings." Thus the nuisance theory, although
expressed and referred to as such in most complaints in this field, has had
little success.
3. Constitutional Taking (Inverse Condemnation)
The theory upon which most recoveries for airport noise have been
based in whole or in part is that the plaintiff's property has been taken by
the airport owner by necessitating flights over it, and that, under either
the fifth or the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, or under
a similar provision of the state constitution, he is entitled to be paid for the
property taken. The famous Causby case rested upon this theory. In fact,
twenty-seven of the thirty-one cases in the last decade in which damages
have been recovered were decided on the theory of constitutional taking-
six involving public civil airports and twenty-one growing out of opera-
tions at military airports.
(a) Requirements for a Taking-What constitutes a taking is one of the
questions of primary current importance. In Causby the Supreme Court
stated, "Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low
and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoy-
ment and use of the land.""
64 E.g., Price v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. & Greenville-Sparta nburg Airport Dist., Ct. C.P., S.C.
Dec., 1964; and Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So. 2d 196, 8 Av. Cas. 18,372 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1964). (The court essentially applied the "legalized nuisance" doctrine, although it spoke in
terms of private nuisance.") In Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146, 3
Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965), the court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff, even though the Kentucky Constitution contains an "injuring" provision, because, using a
nuisance analysis, there was not a sufficient over-all inequity to support a recovery. The court indi-
cated that in its view the use of such a balancing approach is necessary if governmental units in
states with damaging or injuring provisions are not to be subjected to liability for activities for
which private defendants could not be held responsible.
"'Anderson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 1955 U.S. & Can. Av. 182 (Cal. Super. Ct.). See text
accompanying note 54 supra.
66 Chronister v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731, 6 Av. Cas. 3 17,448 (1959).
67 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
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In the Griggs decision in 1962,"8 the Supreme Court recognized, as it
did in the Causby case in 1946, that "the use of land presupposes the use
of some of the airspace above it,' " " but indicated again, as it had in
Causby, that the test for a taking is whether the overflights make "the
property unusable" for the purpose for which it was being used."
In Causby the Court said that a taking existed where it had been found
that overflights on landing and take-off were so low and so frequent over
Mr. Causby's commercial chicken farm that about 150 of the chickens
had flown into the walls from fright and had killed themselves, resulting
in "the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken
farm."'" In Griggs, which came up without any evidence being introduced
for the defense, flights varying in altitude between thirty and three hun-
dred feet over the plaintiff's country home were said to be "regular and
almost continuous,"" and it was testified that the Griggs family had moved
from their home because it was "undesirable and unbearable for their
residential use.""3 In both cases low and frequent overflights were either
proved or alleged without proof to the contrary; in both cases the occu-
pants in fact ceased their use of the property because of the overflights;
and in both cases the Supreme Court made it clear that a taking resulted
because the land, with improvements, was rendered unusable for the use
to which it was being put.7'
In the much-cited and much-discussed Batten v. United States," in
which the court held that there was no taking in the absence of over-
flights, it stated:
[T]he federal courts have long and consistently recognized the distinction
between a taking and consequential damages. In Transportation Company
"8Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See generally the Notes appearing in 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 803 (1962); 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 346 (1962); 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 274; and 24
U. Pr. L. REV. 603 (1963).
"' Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra at 89.
70 Id. at 88. In Griggs the issue was not whether there was a taking, but rather who was liable
for the taking. The holding was that the airport owner was liable, rather than the airlines or the
United States, because the choice of the airport site was its owner's and it was up to the owner to
acquire adequate property rights for approaches.
"' United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
7' Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 87 (1962).
"a Ibid. It is an amusing, and even somewhat meaningful, commentary on the Griggs situation
that Mr. Griggs sold his house and five acres in 1956 "to the St. Philip's Episcopal Church (whose
congregation has since been bothered only a few times on Sunday mornings; when that happens,
says Pastor Donald Clawson, 'we simply stop and say a little silent prayer for the pilot')." Time,
16 March 1962, p. 65.
' While Causby and Griggs indicated that the test of a taking is the extent of interference
with the current use of the property, the court in City of Atlanta v. Donald, 141 S.E.2d 560, 3 Av.
L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,439 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) affirmed the overruling of the defendant's
demurrers, stating that:
[[]t is sufficient to show a taking if the over-flights are low enough and frequent
enough merely to interfere with some potential use of the land. (Court's italics
partially omitted.) Id. at 566.
Such a statement is much too broad. The Restatement of Torts (Second) S 159, comment k, ex-
pressly notes this problem and says that under Causby and federal cases "there is no trespass unless
there is such interference with actual, as distinguished from potential, use." In any case, the Georgia
Supreme Court subsequently reversed in Donald, holding that the city's special demurrers should
have been upheld. City of Atlanta v. Donald, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av.
Cas.) 5 17,713 (1965).
7 306 F.2d 580, 8 Av. Cas. 5 17,101 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
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v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 . . . the Supreme Court held that governmental
activities which do not encroach on private property are not a taking within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment even though the consequences of such
acts may impair the use of the property."
In Batten the court also emphasized that there was "no deprivation of
'all or most' of the plaintiffs' interests" and no suggestion that the prop-
erty had been rendered "uninhabitable." Leavell v. United States,"' in
following Batten, expressly mentioned that the plaintiff had continued to
live in her residence during the entire period. There the court said that
there was no taking,
although there was, indeed, a substantial interference with the use and en-
joyment [of the property]. . . . Although plaintiff's property was located in
an area of major noise, there was no actual invasion of her property rights
by overflights or otherwise, and any damages suffered by her are no more
than a consequence of the operations of the Base."
Since every state constitution requires compensation for a taking or
its equivalent, a case that raises the issue may be decided in a state court
without any reliance on federal law. While the courts' language may
differ from state to state, where the issue has arisen both state and
federal courts have consistently held that, in order to prove a constitutional
taking, it is not enough that a claimant prove low and frequent flights.
He must also, and even more importantly, show that the result has been a
substantial, if not complete, deprivation of the use of his property.
In Thornburg v. Port of Portland,"' the Oregon Supreme Court stated
the rule of what constitutes a taking in this context:
The idea that must be expressed to the jury is that before the plaintiff
may recover for a taking of his property he must show by the necessary
proof that the activities of the government are unreasonably interfering
with his use of his property, and in so substantial a way as to deprive him
of the practical enjoyment of his land. This loss must then be translated
factually by the jury into a reduction in the market value of the land. °
(Emphasis added.)
In a Note written for the Harvard Law Review entitled Airplane Noise:
Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, it was stated:
The degree of interference on the ground should be regarded as the most
relevant indicium of actionable injury, and the height of the planes overhead
is not necessarily correlative with that interference.
[I]n fact the courts have consistently refused to grant compensation for a
"taking" unless there has been a substantial interference." (Footnotes
omitted.)
7 Id. at 583. See generally the Notes appearing in 49 CORNELL L.Q. 116 (1963); 29 J. AIR
L. & COM. 72 (1963); 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 579 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REV. 837 (1963); and 16
VAND. L. REV. 430 (1963).
77 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
"Id. at 739. See also Bellamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
7'233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100, 8 Av. Cas. 5 17,281 (1962).
80d. at 110, 8 Av. Cas. at 5 17,289. See generally Notes appearing in 1963 DUKE L.J. 563,
and 41 TEXAS L. REV. 827 (1963).
8' Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1581, 1583-
84 (1961). For a discussion of recent Florida cases bearing on this question, see note 91 infra. In an-
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While the degree of interference is, in theory, not necessarily correlative
with the altitude "of the planes overhead," a review of the cases in the
last decade where compensation for a taking was finally awarded has dis-
closed that, insofar as it is possible to ascertain from the opinions, in only
two such cases were the usual flights more than 200 feet in altitude over
plaintiffs' properties, and in both of those cases there were some flights
that caused physical contact with the ground. In one, military flights were
sometimes so low that afterburners scorched the foliage; s2 and in the
other, where a taking was not denied, there was a "frequent falling of
dangerous objects." 3
(b) Thornburg v. Port of Portland-As indicated above, it was held
in Batten" that there is a taking only if there are overflights. In the afore-
mentioned review of the airport noise cases in this country since 195 5, no
case was found where damages ultimately were allowed for a taking due to
flights unless there were in fact overflights. However, in its first opinion
in Thornburg v. Port of Portland,5 the Supreme Court of Oregon held
that overflights are not a prerequisite of a taking and that a "noise-
nuisance can amount to a taking." There were only a few overflights and
in its initial four-to-three decision the court ruled that evidence of the
more frequent flights near, but not over, the plaintiffs' property had
been erroneously excluded and remanded the case for trial. In its discussion
the court said that a nuisance could be a taking "any time a possessor is in
fact ousted from the enjoyment of his land." 8 It emphasized that if noise
problems were treated as a nuisance, rather than a trespass question (with
its emphasis on metes and bounds), "the gravity of the harm to the
plaintiff" could be balanced by the jury "against the social utility of the
airport's conduct."" The Oregon Supreme Court was thus more liberal
in admitting evidence from not only the plaintiff but also from the de-
fendant, with the possible result of making it more, rather than less,
difficult for a plaintiff to recover. This liberalization in the admission of
evidence also enabled the tribunal to obtain a more comprehensive view
of all the facts relating to both the plaintiff and the airport. By inquiring
whether the alleged noise-nuisance constituted a taking and by using a
other recent case, State ex rel. Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405,
3 Av. L. Re!p. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,761 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1966), a number of
property owners had alleged that low and frequent flights over their property "interefered with and
destroyed" its usefulness. The Ohio Supreme Court held that there is a taking under the Ohio Con-
stitution whenever flights are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the land. While the court did not specifically mention any require-
ment of substantial interference, it pointed out the extreme facts alleged in Griggs, noted that the
property in Causby had been rendered unusable as a chicken farm, and characterized its holding in
Royal as an application of the principles found in Causby and Griggs. According to the dissent,
the majority's decision "launched a vessel of unknown dimensions for an indefinite voyage on an
uncharted sea to an undisclosed destination . . . " and opened the way for property owners to
recover "varying amounts of money damages for injury to their sensibilities."
S"Wright v. United States, 279 F.2d 517, 6 Av. Cas. 5 18,075 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
S3 jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444, 8 Av. Cas. 1 17,127 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
'Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 8 Av. Cas. 5 17,101 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963).
85233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100, 101; 8 Av. Cas. 17,281 (1962).
" Id. at 105; 8 Av. Cas. at 5 17,285.
871d. at 107; 8 Av. Cas. at 5 17,286.
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nuisance approach in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the Supreme
Court of Oregon invited greater emphasis on the interests of the public
than the usual taking approach would entail.
The dissenting opinion in Thornburg, perhaps because of the public
discussion of "judicial legislation" and the importance of the doctrine of
stare decisis, discussed the classic differences between the theories of taking
and nuisance" and suggested that the Oregon court should have left the
task to the people's elected representatives if this distinction were to be
destroyed."9 It also noted that there was no precedent for the majority's
holding that evidence of lateral flights should be admitted in an action
for a taking. The dissent concluded that if the plaintiffs wished to sue
for damages for a nuisance they could do so, but that the trial court
had committed no error in the action for a taking. However, both the
majority and the minority in the original Thornburg opinion concluded
that the plaintiffs must show substantial interference in order to obtain
relief.
On remand the jury found against the plaintiffs in Thornburg, and
they appealed on eleven assignments of error that challenged instructions
8s Justice Perry, who wrote the dissent (in which Chief Justice McAllister and Justice Rossman
joined) stated at 113-16, 8 Av. Cas. at 5 17,291-93, that:
[T]he definition of a constitutional taking has consistently been grounded in the
appropriation of an interest in the realty itself.
A nuisance, although a tort, does not contemplate a physical invasion of the prop-
erty of another, but the use of a person's own property in such a way as to inter-
fere with another's free enjoyment of his property.
It is the right of an owner of land to use his land in any lawful manner, and it is
only when the manner of use creates a grave interference with another's enjoyment
of his property that the law will seek to redress this type of wrong. This is a natural
requirement of organized society. There must be some give and take to promote the
well-being of all. The underlying basis in nuisance law is the common-sense thought
that in organized society there must be an adjustment between reasonable use and
personal discomfort. No such consideration is involved in the law of trespass . . .
it is the taking of an owner's possessory interest in land as compared with interfering
with an owner's use and enjoyment of his land that distinguishes a trespass which is
a "taking" from a nuisance, which is not.
An owner's use of his own land will not create liability unless his use causes sub-
stantial interference with another's enjoyment of his property. . . . Also, the utility
of the use that creates the nuisance must be weighed against the "gravity of the
harm."
Such considerations are foreign to the law of trespass.
The dissenters also pointed to the difference in results:
A nuisance takes none of the title of the property. The full legal title rests in the
owner. If the nuisance is abated in any manner, the damage suffered has ended and
the land is again restored to its full value to the owner. On the other hand, if there
is a taking, the property right of ownership or some interest therein has been trans-
ferred from the owner to the sovereign, and does not again revert to the original
owner even though the use to which the property has been put by the sovereign ceases.
s9 The dissenters said with respect to this political course:
As pointed out by the majority in Batten v. United States, supra, this course has
been taken in many states by its citizens, and this is the course which should be taken
in this state, if the entire burden is to be borne by the public. Id. at 116; 8 Av.
Cas. at 5 17,293.
See also Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 555 (1914).
In the last of the above quotations the dissenters were referring to states with constitutional
damaging, as well as taking, provisions. The State of Washington, where Martin v. Port of Seattle,
infra note 90, was decided, is such a state.
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to the jury. In June 1966, in an opinion as yet unreported, the Supreme
Court of Oregon unanimously reversed on the ground that dictum in its
earlier opinion had led the trial court into the error of "abstract, repeti-
tious and conflicting instructions" which overemphasized the social utility
of the airport. While this later opinion seems to have reaffirmed the sub-
stantiality test, it also appears to have reversed the court's earlier emphasis
on the social utility of the airport.
In sending the case back "for yet another trial," the Oregon Supreme
Court said that it was up to the trial judge to"rule out the mere annoyance,
or interference of a kind that would be objectionable only to the super-
sensitive." Then, if there is a jury question, it is for the jury to decide
whether the interference with use and enjoyment is "substantial enough
to result in a loss of market value," and thereby constitute a taking. The
trial court's special instructions may point up the difference "between
negligible, or inconsequential, interferences which all property owners
must share and the direct, peculiar, and substantial interferences which
result in a loss of market value to the extent that a disinterested observer
would characterize the loss as a taking." The court concluded that it was
error to tell the jury to consider the airport's utility "in deciding whether
the plaintiff's property had been depreciated in value by the defendant's
activities."
4. Constitutional Damaging
Martin v. Port of Seattle" was decided in 1964 by the Washington
Supreme Court, sitting en banc. Regardless of whether a nuisance, a con-
stitutional taking, or a constitutional damaging is alleged, Martin is the
only known case in which damages have actually been recovered without
any requirement of a showing that the damages claimed are at least "sub-
stantial."'"
9064 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540, 8 Av. Cas. 18,324 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965). Note, 39 WASH. L. REV. 398 (1964); Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-
Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920 (1964).
91In Rose v. Port of Seattle, 3 Av. L. REP,. (9 Av. Cas.) 17,916 (Super. Ct., Wash. 1965),
the plaintiff recovered $1,000. Presumably, this recovery was based on a taking theory, although
that is not completely clear from the court's memorandum decision. In any case, the opinion does
not discuss the degree of interference necessary to support a recovery.
Early this year a Florida trial court held that several plaintiffs residing near Tampa Interna-
tional Airport were entitled to an order requiring the Aviation Authority to institute condemnation
proceedings where aircraft operations appeared to "materially reduce the ordinary use and enjoy-
ment" of their property (where there were overflights) or to cause a "substantial interference"
(where there were no overflights) with such use and enjoyment. Benitez v. Hillsborough County
Aviation Authority, Civil No. 139928, 13th Cir. Ct., Hillsborough County, Fla., 18 Jan. 1966.
Although Florida has only a constitutional taking provision, the judge in Benitez believed that such
a result was required in the light of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964),
which, he believed, "adopted the spirit and language of the Martin decision rejecting the substantial
interference doctrine.... " In Schumann, however, the primary issue was whether overflights must be
alleged in Florida in order to state a cause of action in inverse condemnation and, while the Schu-
mann court did quote language from Martin concerning the lack of any requirement of substantial
interference (where there is a constitutional damaging provision), the Schumann opinion does not
rely on Martin any more than on Thornburg, Causby and Griggs-all three of which do require
some sort of substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property before there may be
a recovery for a taking. It is the author's understanding that the Aviation Authority intends to
appeal the Benitez case.
In two other recent Florida decisions, both of which were decided after the Court of Appeals
decision in Schumann, the usual view that there must be some kind of substantial interference with
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Martin and its companion case, Aarhus v. Port of Seattle,2 were brought
by 196 plaintiffs, who lived within sixteen blocks of the southern end of
the clear zone at Seattle-Tacoma Airport, against the Port of Seattle as
owner-operator. Some plaintiffs were subject to overflights; some were
not. Takings were alleged as resulting from noise and vibration caused by
low and frequent flights of jets. The plaintiffs relied on both the Wash-
ington and United States Constitutions. In addition, all plaintiffs alleged
constitutional damaging under the Washington constitution.93 As will be
seen, the decision disregarded the taking problem and rested solely on
the conclusion that there had been damaging. By stipulation, the only
issue originally tried before the judge was liability, with damages reserved
for subsequent jury trials. The trial judge held the Port liable to all the
plaintiffs, en masse, without any effort to ascertain the degree of inter-
ference with the individual plaintiff's use of his property. Although the
Washington Supreme Court had earlier decided in Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle" that the claimants there would have to prove that the value of
their vacant land had been, as alleged, "substantially diminished," the
trial judge in Martin said that under Causby and Griggs:
[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that it is contrary to the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment for any government operating an
airfield to not condemn and pay for reasonable use of air space adjacent to
airports."
This was patently in error. The difference is self-apparent between re-
quiring payment for the "reasonable use of air space adjacent to airports"
and requiring compensation for a taking under the tests of Causby, Griggs,
Thornburg, and even Ackerman.
The Supreme Court of Washington unanimously affirmed but on differ-
the use and enjoyment of property before a property owner can recover for a constitutional taking
has been reaffirmed. Corbett v. City of Jacksonville, Civil No. 63-2246-E, 4th Cir. Ct., Duval
County, Fla., 10 Dec. 1965, and Schumann v. City of Jacksonville, Civil No. 63-4547-E, 4th Cir.
Ct., Duval County, Fla., 26 Jan. 1966. (While the judge was bound by the previous decision of
the Court of Appeals supra-that overflights are not required for a taking in Florida-he noted
that he "would personally favor the reasoning and logic as expressed by .. . [George A. Spater in]
the article, 'Noise and the Law,' appearing in Volume 63, Michigan Law Review 1373.")
9264 Wash. 2d 298, 391 P.2d 540, 8 Av. Cas. 5 18,324 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965).
13 WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 16, as amended by amend. IX:
No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without
just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner ...
(Emphasis added.)
See, 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441[1] (3rd rev. ed. 1963), which discusses the definition
of "damage" under such provisions and concludes, with explanation as to the various courts' rea-
soning, that in most jurisdictions the definition used is narrower than simply "any public use of
land which caused an actual ascertainable depreciation of the present market value of neighboring
land .. ." Id. at 489. In Martin this broader definition was applied even though NICHOLS cites
three prior Washington Supreme Court cases as following a narrower definition. Id. at 490. None of
these three cases were cited in the Martin opinion: Taylor v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., 85 Wash.
592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915); Hieber v. City of Spokane, 73 Wash. 122, 131 Pac. 478 (1913); and
Smith v. Saint P., M. & M. Ry., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840 (1905).
In addition to Washington, twenty-five states have constitutional provisions providing for the
payment of just compensation for a damaging or injury. See, 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §
6.1[3] (3rd rev. ed. 1963).
55 Wash. 2d 500, 348 P.2d 664, 6 Av. Cas. 5 17,876 (1960).
"Martin v. Port of Seattle, Civil No. 560219, Super. Ct., King County, Wash., 5 Oct. 1962,
aff'd, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
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ent grounds. It relied on the constitutional damaging clause of the state
constitution and saw no need for drawing any distinction between what
constitutes a taking and what does not because, in any event, under the
constitutional damaging clause, the Port was liable for any damage caused
any of the plaintiffs by aircraft operations. Damage was held to mean any
proven decline in the market value of real estate that resulted from the
operation of jet aircraft in and out of the airport. This test is far easier
for a plaintiff to meet than that set out in the second Thornburg opinion
which requires proof of "direct, peculiar and substantial" interference
which results in a loss of market value "to the extent that a disinterested
observer would characterize the loss as a taking."
The court expressly rejected the contention that, whether a taking or
mere damaging were alleged, the constitution requires compensation only
if there is at least substantial interference with the plaintiffs' property.
The Washington Supreme Court ignored its prior railroad decisions where
it had rejected the contention that damages were recoverable under Wash-
ington's constitutional damaging provision if proper, non-negligent opera-
tion of a railroad depreciated the value of the plaintiff's property." Such
damages it had said were "damnum absque injuria" even though the rail-
road operations had allegedly caused great damage, including fires.
The Washington Supreme Court also stated that the so-called inverse
condemnation cases are the same as direct condemnation cases in which
the state must pay whatever damage is assessed, regardless of the sub-
stantiality of interference or the amount of the damage. However, the
court overlooked the fundamental fact that in a condemnation case the
public body exercising the power of eminent domain has already made an
administrative determination that the property in question (or a part there-
of or interest therein) is required and is to be used by the public, and must
therefore be paid for. In an inverse condemnation case, the public body
has made the opposite decision-that it will not be using the plaintiff's
property. Having in mind the grayness of the area between private and
public rights in such situations, should not the plaintiff in an inverse
condemnation case thus be required to show that the alleged interference
with his property is not just the necessary and incidental concomitant of
proper operation of the public facility, the burden and benefits of which
are shared by the whole community, but is instead so direct, peculiar, and
substantial as to require his property to be bought and paid for out of the
tax funds of the community of which he is a part? This was the theory
of the leading railroad case in the United States Supreme Court." It is
'E.g., Taylor v. Chicago M. & St. P. R.R., 85 Wash. 592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915), and cases
cited therein. See also Wilkening v. State, 54 Wash. 2d 692, 344 P.2d 204 (1959); Drainage Dist.
No. 6 v. Snohomish River Boom Co., 142 Wash. 591, 253 Pac. 1072 (1927); and Barry v. Murray,
131 Wash. 670, 231 Pac. 10 (1924). See also note 93 supra.
97 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). Spater, Noise and the Law,
63 MIcH. L. REV. 1373 (1965), concludes, on the basis of a careful analysis of the federal cases,
that under the federal constitution there can be no taking of tangible property unless there is a
physical or direct "invasion" of the property and the invasion is of a type which results in its
"exclusive and permanent appropriation"; and therefore that noise alone cannot constitute a taking
as defined in such cases. Support for this view may be derived from the fact that the existing uses
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also, in essence, the theory of the leading constitutional damaging free-
way case in California 8 which, like Washington, has a constitutional dam-
aging provision.
By early 1966, after separate trials on the issue of liability had been
begun in both Martin and Aarhus, separate settlements were negotiated in
both cases. Under the settlements the Port of Seattle obtained defined
avigation easements in return for payments of approximately $150,000
(to the Martin plaintiffs) and $250,000 (to the Aarhus plaintiffs)." Mean-
while, however, the Washington Supreme Court decided another taking
case, Anderson v. Port of Seattle,"° where constitutional damaging was
not before it. In that case the court seems to have followed Batten in
requiring overflights to constitute a taking while also going part way in
requiring substantial interference with use in order for there to be a taking.
In Martin, in order to avoid the ten-year statute of limitations applicable
to a taking,'' the plaintiffs contended (unsuccessfully) that the opera-
tion of piston planes had not amounted to a taking. In Anderson, an older
case which was wending its way through the courts more slowly, it had
been stipulated that the alleged overhead flights of piston planes had con-
situated a taking, but the trial court had held that the takings had occurred
shortly after the airport was opened in 1947 and that damages for the
takings were therefore barred by the ten-year statute of limitations.'
On appeal the plaintiffs sought some form of the strict taking test so that
the takings would be held to have occurred some years later, when flights
were more frequent. This would in turn have meant that their claims
would not have been barred. In addition, three plaintiffs appealed from
the trial court's dismissal of their claims upon a finding, as a matter of
law, that their properties "were not under the low and regular flight
pattern."
Since no constitutional damaging claims were before the Washington
Supreme Court in Anderson (having been held to have been barred by
the applicable three-year statute of limitations), it was faced with deciding
not only the test for a taking (i.e., when the taking occurred) but also
whether there can be a taking without "low and regular" overflights.
On 17 June 1965, the Supreme Court of Washington held'03 that there was
no taking until there were "continuing and frequent low flights" and also
affirmed the dismissal of the three plaintiffs' claims, thereby, at least by
implication, following the Batten case, although it was not cited. Since
of the premises had been terminated by the plaintiffs in both the Causby and Griggs cases and
from the comments by the courts in the Batten and Leavell cases, where the courts held that there
had been no taking, that the properties in question had not been rendered uninhabitable. (See notes
71-76 and related text.)
"SPeople ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rep.
363 (1960).
9SSee note 53 supra.
'00403 P.2d 368, 3 Av. L. REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 17,723 (Wash. 1965).
'O WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.020 (1962). There is a three-year statute of limitations in
Washington for constitutional damaging claims. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080 (1962).
'
0
°Super. Ct., King County, Wash., 29 June 1960.




constitutional damaging claims were not involved, the Martin decision does
not appear to have been affected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intention of this article is to put the public airport noise problem
in some perspective, to show the extent to which the constitutional taking
theory has been the usual ground for such suits, and to highlight the
central problem of when there is liability on such a theory. The public
airport noise problem is comprised of many parts, but as far as legal
theory is concerned it is essentially just another chapter in the long history
of accommodation between public needs and private rights. A major
service could be performed by a first-rate, full-length study by a legal
scholar acquainted with the field, which would be specifically designed
to put all annoyance cases, whether involving aviation, railroad, highway,
school, hospital, prison, or other source and whether concerned with noise,
vibration, smoke, or other annoyance, into proper context with one an-
other and with the development of related law. Meanwhile, the danger of
a decision like Martin is that, while it reflects sympathy for the affected
community and excitement over the newness of jet flight, it is lacking
in perspective. It establishes, under Washington's constitutional damaging
provision, a law for public airport noise problems that is sui generis. The
decision thereby puts an unequal burden on the reasonable development
of air transportation as compared with that of other modern facilities.
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